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C
ongestion has been and continues to be a
problem at many airports throughout the
United States. For example, in the first five
months of 2001, over 25 percent of the flights arriv-
ing at the nation’s 11 busiest airports were more
than 15 minutes late.1 Despite a decline in travelers
and flights in 2001, which was associated with the
recession that began that spring and the September
11 terrorist attacks, congestion remained a problem
in some locations.2 For example, 16.2 percent of
the flights bound for Lambert–St. Louis International
Airport from May 1, 2001, through June 30, 2001,
arrived late, with an average delay of roughly 55
minutes. Using the same period one year later, 16.3
percent of the arriving flights were delayed, with
an average delay time of roughly 56 minutes.3
Congestion imposes costs on both the users
and providers of airline transportation services. A
common response is to expand the capacity of air-
ports in the most afflicted regions. Consequently,
airport expansions have occurred and are occurring
in many major cities, including Atlanta and St. Louis.4
Figure 1 shows that the amount of federal, state,
and local government spending on airports increased
in all but two years between 1986 and 1999.5Federal,
state, and local funds for U.S. airports in 1999 totaled
over $20 billion, up from $11 billion in 1985 (using
constant, 1996 dollars).
Expansions are costly, complex, and controver-
sial. For example, the cost of “Phase 1” of the current
expansion of Lambert–St. Louis International
Airport is $1.1 billion. The key component of this
project is the construction of a new runway.6 To
add this runway, the approved project entailed the
acquisition of more than 1,500 acres of land, which
ignited protests from affected homeowners and
businesses; the reconfiguration of seven major roads;
the movement of some airport support operations
and the Missouri Air National Guard facility; and
the construction of a new school.7
We begin our analysis by providing a discussion
of how congestion arises and how it can be dealt
with. Because the air transportation services provided
by one airport are related to the services provided
by many airports, delays at one airport have adverse
effects on the movement of passengers and freight
at other airports.8 Thus, the expansion of one air-
port can assist the movement of passengers and
freight at other airports. This interdependence pro-
vides an economic justification for a decisionmak-
ing authority above the level of individual airports,
such as a governmental body, to be involved in the
approval as well as the financing of expansions.
However, when both congestion and network exter-
nalities are present, the appropriate government
actions may be to levy a tax, to provide a subsidy,
or possibly to refrain from any intervention.
To justify a specific airport expansion, its bene-
fits must exceed its costs. We examine how the
benefits and costs of expansions are measured. We
use the expansion of Lambert–St. Louis International
Airport to illustrate many of the key points.
6 Lambert International Airport web site: <http://www.lambert-pmo.org/
about/phase1/default.asp>.
7 See Gilbert (2002) for details.
8 The relationships among airports create a network. One feature of
this network is the “hub and spoke” system. Flights from various remote
airports (the nodes on the spokes) converge on one airport (the hub).
Flight schedules provide some time for passengers to change planes,
before they depart for their final destinations.
1 See Salant (2001).
2 The terrorist attacks also spurred increased screening of passengers and
luggage, which generated other forms of congestion. See Coughlin,
Cohen, and Khan (2002) for a discussion of aviation security and
terrorism.
3 Data on average flight delays were found at <http://www.bts.gov/
ntda/oai/SummaryStatistics?DEMO/SummaryStatistics>.
4 However, the current financial problems of airlines and airports have,
at least temporarily, led to either the cancellation or delay of an esti-
mated $16 billion in capital projects at numerous airports, including
ones in Los Angeles, Boston, and Phoenix. See Bayles (2001).
5 Bureau of Transportation Statistics web site: <http://www.bts.gov/
transtu/govfin/2001/tables/table_1b.html>.
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expansions—the displacement of people and the
environmental effects. The controversy as well as
the cost of expansion projects has spurred the search
for alternative ways to reduce congestion. One alter-
native that we examine, which reduces congestion
by using existing capacity more efficiently, is con-
gestion-based pricing of landing fees.
ANALYZING CONGESTION IN THE AIR
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
Expanding the capacity of an airport entails a
multi-year capital expansion project to construct a
runway and/or a terminal. The financing of expan-
sions generally includes funding provided by a
governmental body. An alternative in some cases
to increasing an airport’s infrastructure is to use its
existing facilities more efficiently. This alternative
approach to reduce the adverse effects of congestion
can be implemented in the short run via the setting
of appropriate prices or taxes.
The potential role of taxes/subsidies in respond-
ing to congestion as well as network externalities
can be explained using marginal benefit/marginal
cost curves.9 A potential traveler who wishes to fly
from St. Louis to Boston, for example, faces two
costs—the airfare (“x” dollars per trip) plus the
opportunity cost of travel time (“y” dollars per hour).
In Figure 2, with the units of measurement being
dollars on the vertical axis and passenger trips on
the horizontal axis, the marginal benefit (or demand)
curve has a negative slope. This curve indicates, for
our example, that when the price of air travel from
St. Louis to Boston is high, only the few people who
value their trips highly would choose to travel. As
the price of a trip is reduced, more travelers will
take this trip.
The explanation for the shapes of the private
and social marginal cost curves is slightly more
complicated.10 The shapes hinge on the impact of
congestion costs. At air traffic levels less than QC in
Figure 2, the marginal cost curve is flat. The flatness
indicates that congestion has not set in yet, and the
cost for passengers is the monetary cost of their
tickets plus a “fixed” value related to the opportunity
cost of travel.11 Consequently, the “social” marginal
10 MAY/JUNE 2003
10 Our exposition of the marginal cost curve is similar to O’Sullivan’s
(2003) analysis for highways. Neither exposition attempts to directly
link the marginal cost curve with a supply curve; however, the monetary
cost of airfare is related to a supply curve. Instead, we rely upon the
principle that the socially optimal number of passenger trips occurs
at a quantity where the marginal benefits curve intersects the social
marginal cost curve. 
11 With no time delays stemming from congestion, travel time is fixed.
Thus, the total value of travel time is also fixed.
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9 Initially, we assume airport capacity is fixed. Later, we relax this
assumption. In the long run, airport authorities can choose both the
size of an airport as well as the congestion tax that generates the
optimal traffic volume. For additional details on congestion taxes
and traffic volume for highways, see O’Sullivan (2003, Chap. 11).cost curve coincides with the “private” marginal
cost curve.
For air traffic levels greater than QC, however,
the marginal cost curve is upward sloping. The
positively sloped part of the private marginal cost
curve can be understood by considering the notion
that, beyond some threshold level, when a particular
individual chooses to consume additional air travel,
he adds additional traffic to the system, which slows
down his own travel. Additional passenger trips
translate into more flights, which is one source of
congestion. In addition, more passengers cause more
crowded airport terminals, creating delays at ticket
counters and security checkpoints. When passengers
anticipate these delays, they arrive at the airport
earlier and increase their travel time. Moreover,
additional passenger trips result in increased delays
at the baggage claim carousel at the end of a trip.
Thus, we are assuming that trip time varies directly
with the number of passenger trips. This longer
trip time increases the marginal passenger’s own
trip cost, due to the higher opportunity cost of the
travel time, which is added to the monetary cost.
When accounting for congestion in the manner
described above, the social marginal cost curve
differs from the private marginal cost curve. Namely,
when an additional passenger uses the airport more,
in addition to increasing his own travel time by
adding to congestion, this passenger increases the
travel time of other airport users as well. This passen-
ger does not take this additional cost into account,
so existing travelers could be made better off if the
would-be passenger did not travel. This additional
cost causes the social marginal cost curve to lie
above the private marginal cost curve.
This increase in total travel time can be calcu-
lated by multiplying the total number of airport
users by the additional travel delay that the marginal
user generates. At levels of passenger trips slightly
greater than the congestion threshold, QC, this travel
congestion externality is small, so the difference
between the social and private marginal cost curves
is relatively small. But as the number of passenger
trips rises, an individual increasing his air travel adds
greater cost to other travelers, due to the assumption
that trip time is an increasing function of passenger
volume. As a result, the difference between the social
and private marginal cost curves is larger at higher
levels of passenger traffic.
The socially optimal level of air traffic in this
context occurs at Qtax in Figure 2, where the marginal
benefit curve intersects the social marginal cost
curve. Note that this level of passenger trips is less
than QP, which is the level of passenger trips associ-
ated with the intersection of the marginal benefit
and private marginal cost curves.
One way to achieve the socially optimal level
of passenger trips, which requires the marginal
benefits of air travel to equal the social marginal
costs, is through a congestion tax on air travel from
St. Louis to Boston. In Figure 2, a tax per unit of air
traffic volume equal to the distance from PP to PS
will yield this socially optimal level of passenger
trips. The cost associated with the tax forces each
traveler to pay for the costs that his travel imposes
on others. The net gain resulting from the tax is
represented by the triangle ABC. The net gain reflects
the fact that for a level of passenger trips QP, marginal
social costs exceeds marginal benefits by the dis-
tance from B to C. The tax causes passenger trips to
decrease from QP to Qtax and eliminates the gap
between marginal social costs and marginal benefits.
Thus, the net gain is the sum of the differences
between marginal social costs and marginal benefits
as passenger trips decrease from QP to Qtax.
A congestion tax, however, is not the only policy
option. An alternative policy, shown in Figure 3, is
to expand the airport at which the congestion is
present. Airport expansion shifts the private and
social marginal cost curves rightward. In addition,
the congestion “threshold” occurs at a larger num-
ber of passenger trips, increasing from QT to QTX.
Whether congestion persists depends not only on
the size of the expansion, but also on the elasticity
of air travel demand.12 If travel demand is relatively
inelastic, then it is likely that the expansion leads
to a new equilibrium level of passenger trips, QI,
below the congestion threshold. In this hypothetical
example, the relatively inelastic demand implies
that consumers of air travel are not very responsive
to the lower cost of travel, so quantity demanded
does not increase by enough to create additional
congestion. If demand is relatively elastic, however,
then it is possible that the new equilibrium, QE,
will occur above the congestion threshold, and the
social marginal cost will be greater than the private
marginal cost. Because consumers are relatively
responsive to changes in the trip cost, the expansion
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12 If a given percentage change in trip cost, say a 1 percent decline,
leads to a relatively small change in air traffic volume, say a less than
1 percent increase, then the price elasticity of air traffic demand is
inelastic. If, however, the 1 percent decline in trip cost is associated
with a more than 1 percent increase in air traffic volume, the price
elasticity of air traffic demand is elastic.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Cohen and Coughlinleads to a relatively large increase in the quantity
of passenger trips demanded; thus, congestion
persists.13
The preceding discussion ignores the crucial
issue of whether a specific expansion generates
benefits greater than its costs. In the example,
depending on the elasticity of air traffic demand,
travelers benefit by avoiding some or all congestion
costs. The reduced congestion costs also induce
more travel, which provides additional benefits.
Reduced congestion also provides benefits for the
providers of air transportation services. For example,
airlines are likely to benefit in the form of reduced
operating costs. Later, we examine how to calculate
and compare the value of the benefits with the costs
of an expansion.
The preceding discussion also focuses on con-
gestion at a single airport and, as a result, ignores a
key feature of the air transportation system. Account-
ing for the network structure of the hub and spoke
system, while temporarily ignoring congestion
issues, leads to a somewhat different picture con-
cerning airport expansions. If the local airport plan-
ning authority makes a decision on the desired
level of passenger capacity by equating the local
(or private) marginal benefits to the marginal costs,
then it is possible that there would be a suboptimal
level of capacity. Namely, the hub and spoke network
structure of the air transportation system implies that
individuals who use a particular hub airport as a
stopover point receive benefits in the form of
reduced travel time from use of the hub airport in
one leg of their travel.
In the specific case of St. Louis, if Lambert
Airport does not expand, then it will cause conges-
tion and slowdowns throughout the country, even
on some flights that do not go through St. Louis.
Thus, if a local authority chooses the level of airport
capacity by considering only the local benefits, then
equating the local marginal benefits to the marginal
costs would lead to QO passenger trips (in Figure 4)
and a passenger trip capacity that is too small. The
reason for such a conclusion is that the social
marginal benefits of air traffic capacity are likely to
be greater than the local marginal benefits.
The socially optimal level of air capacity provi-
sion, however, occurs where the social marginal
benefit curve intersects the marginal cost curve
(before expansion). In Figure 4 this intersection
yields a passenger trip volume of Q1. One possibility
for attaining point Q1 is further expansion of local
airports. This expansion, which lowers the marginal
cost of passenger trips by shifting the marginal cost
curve to the right, can be accomplished through
subsidies (or intergovernmental grants) to the local
12 MAY/JUNE 2003
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13 According to O’Sullivan (2003), a similar phenomenon of “latent
demand” occurs for highway expansions, contributing to the continua-
tion of congestion following the expansion.
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Figure 4airport authorities from the federal government.14
The resulting equilibrium of passenger trips occurs
at the socially optimal Q1, where the new marginal
cost curve intersects the local (private) marginal
benefit curve. 
If we consider both types of spillovers simulta-
neously—the congestion externality and network
externality—we obtain an ambiguous policy recom-
mendation. Namely, in Figure 5, the social marginal
cost curve lies above the private marginal cost curve
because of the congestion externality, and the social
marginal benefit curve lies above the private marginal
benefit curve because of the network externality. The
socially optimal level of airport traffic, Q*, occurs
at the intersection of the social marginal benefit
curve and the social marginal cost curve. In general,
this occurrence may be at a passenger trip level
that is greater than, less than, or equal to the level
that would be attained privately.
In Figure 5, the social marginal benefit and
social marginal cost curves are drawn so that govern-
ment intervention would not be necessary. In this
case, the congestion effect, which can be mitigated
by a tax, is exactly offset by the network effect, which
can be accommodated by a subsidy. If the conges-
tion effect were relatively more pronounced than
the network effect, then governmental intervention
by means of a tax would be justified in theory. On
the other hand, if the network effect were relatively
more pronounced than the congestion effect, then
governmental intervention by means of a subsidy
would be justified in theory. Thus, when accounting
for both types of externalities, the policy prescription
is ambiguous unless one knows the sizes of the
effects. To accurately determine the amount of the
tax or subsidy to address both externalities simul-
taneously, one must know the sizes of both the net-
work and congestion effects.
MEASURING THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF AIRPORTS AND AIRPORT
EXPANSIONS
Nearly all studies attempting to measure the
benefits and costs of airports and airport expan-
sions are encompassed by the following categories
of analysis:
• input-output models,
• production function/growth studies, or
• benefit-cost analyses.15
For the analysis of individual expansion projects, a
benefit-cost analysis is a crucial component for
determining whether an expansion is justified. We
will examine this approach after highlighting some
results from the two other approaches that are
used to analyze the economic impact of airports.
Input-Output Models and Local
Economic Impacts of Airports and
Airport Expansions
A standard tool for calculating the economic
impact of airports in general, as well as the economic
impact of a specific airport, is an input-output
model.16 The impact of an expansion can be esti-
mated as well. What this tool cannot provide, how-
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15 Pfähler (2001) notes that computational general equilibrium analysis
is the state-of-the-art method to estimate the microeconomic effects
of large publicly funded projects. This approach, because of its com-
plexity and cost, is not common in airport studies. Thus, we do not
examine this approach.
16 An input-output model is a mathematical description of how all the
sectors of an economy are related. For an introduction to input-output
models and their limitations, see Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1991),
Pfähler (2001), and O’Sullivan (2003). For advanced discussions, see
Miller (1998) and Lahr and Dietzenbacher (2001).
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14 The suggestion that subsidies can lead to the social optimum ignores
the practical problem of financing the subsidy, which may entail the
use of distortionary taxes.ever, is a rigorous determination of whether a spe-
cific project should be undertaken.17
A study of the economic impact of Lambert–
St. Louis International Airport by the Mumphrey
Group (1996) estimated that for 1994 the economic
impact of Lambert Airport was $5.1 billion, support-
ing 53,900 jobs, which is 4.4 percent of the total jobs
in the St. Louis area. Based on forecasts of future
aircraft operations, passenger enplanements, and
cargo, for 2015 the economic impact of Lambert
was estimated to be $7.8 billion, with employment
of 84,500. This estimate of the future economic
impact did not depend on the proposed expansion
program; however, separate from the ongoing opera-
tions of Lambert, estimates of the impact of total
construction spending at Lambert (including the
runway expansion) were generated. Over a ten-year
period, the total estimated impact of new construc-
tion at Lambert was $4.7 billion, or $470 million
per year. This impact translates into annual house-
hold payroll of $108 million and 4,300 jobs.
Frequently, airport expansions have occurred
simultaneously with the growth of an area. Accord-
ing to former Atlanta mayor Bill Campbell, as
reported by McRainey (2002), Atlanta’s Hartsfield
Airport “anchors a regional economy that in 1998
outpaced the U.S. economic growth by more than
two to one. And, the benefits of this output, including
the performance of our airport, extend well beyond
the boundaries of our region.” The 1980 terminal
addition and the 1994 new international concourse
have “helped Atlanta become a business magnet.”
What is difficult to measure, however, is the extent
to which the airport expansions contributed to
economic growth.
Cooper (1990) notes that the purpose of econ-
omic impact studies is “more political than analyti-
cal.”18 Thus, one might have more confidence in
studies of the economic impact of airport expansions
in which the authors are less likely to have a political
or economic stake in the results. One academic
study of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport’s expansions
by Hakfoort, Poot, and Rietveld (2001) finds relatively
modest economic impacts. Namely, they find that
if the Schiphol airport had stopped growing in 1987,
there would have been 42,000 fewer jobs in the
Greater Amsterdam region in 1998.19
In summarizing their usefulness, Pfähler (2001)
notes that input-output studies capture only some
of the economic effects of a public expenditure
program and that these effects may not be the rele-
vant ones. Such studies are focused on the short-run
demand effects and ignore the economic reasons
for these projects. These projects should deliver
services either to be used as intermediate inputs to
produce goods/services by private firms or as a final
consumption good/service. In the former case, the
projects should stimulate productivity and growth;
in the latter case, the projects should expand the
consumption opportunities of consumers. Thus,
an input-output approach will necessarily fail to
provide an adequate analysis of a specific expansion
project. 
Production Function/Growth Studies
A common assertion is that an airport expan-
sion will stimulate growth. This assertion is part of
a view that public capital is a key ingredient for
economic growth in a region. A large literature,
propelled by Aschauer (1989), has addressed this
issue. Aschauer (2000a) summarized this literature
by noting that the estimates concerning the effect
of public capital investment on private output ranged
from very high to very low (low being not only zero,
but negative).
In the present context, the issue is the impact
of airport infrastructure on growth. Generally speak-
ing, transportation infrastructure has been found
to matter for growth. For example, Easterly and
Rebelo (1993) find that infrastructure capital, espe-
cially that associated with transportation and com-
munications, is related positively to economic
growth.20 However, few studies have focused on
airport infrastructure. One exception is Cohen and
Paul (2001), who estimate that a doubling of airport
infrastructure capital in a particular state would
lead to a 10 percent fall in manufacturing costs in
14 MAY/JUNE 2003
19 Montalvo (1998) reported results of a 1991 study by the Air Transport
Action Group that found the worldwide average of between 2,500 and
7,500 total jobs generated per million passengers. The total economic
impact per million passengers is between $120 million and $1.5 billion.
See Pfähler (2001) for a number of impact studies.
20 Other studies have found that a given percentage increase in core
capital (i.e., streets, highways, mass transit, sewers, and water systems)
tends to have larger effects on output than other types of public capital.
See Aschauer (1989, 2000b), Munnell (1990), and Lighart (2000).
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17 See Niemeier (2001) for a discussion of the (mis)use of input-output
analysis by the airline industry and for a statement that such an
approach cannot answer whether the benefits of an expansion exceed
its costs.
18 A similar conclusion was reached by Sanders (2002) in a review of
convention center expansion studies. In a similar vein, Pfähler (2001)
notes that input-output studies are more useful for generating politi-
cal support for an expansion project than in assessing its merits. that state. Thus, significant cost savings may accrue
to the manufacturing sector from airport invest-
ments.21 A second exception is Brueckner (2003),
who examines the impact of changes in passenger
enplanements in metropolitan areas on employment
in the given area. He finds that employment in a
metropolitan area increases by 1 percent for every
10 percent increase in passenger enplanements. To
reiterate, however, the issue of whether a specific
expansion is justified is not answered by such studies.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
Plans to expand the capacity of airports are
subjected to a required benefit-cost analysis (BCA)
prior to approval by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) (1999). During a BCA, the benefits realized
and the costs borne by the producer and the con-
sumers of the output, as well as the benefits realized
and the costs borne by anyone else (so-called third
parties), are incorporated in the analysis. A BCA,
especially for a large project, can be very compli-
cated. We examine key aspects of the BCA process
using information from a BCA of Lambert–St. Louis
International Airport.
Background on the Lambert–St. Louis
International Airport Expansion. During 2001,
passenger traffic at Lambert totaled 26.7 million,
making Lambert the 17th busiest airport in the
United States.22 Passenger traffic during 2001
declined sharply, falling nearly 13 percent from
the level of 30.6 million in 2000. Similar to airports
throughout the United States, the sharp decline in
passengers can be tied directly to the national
economic recession that began during the spring
of 2001 and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The airport
serves the 2.6 million residents and the businesses
in the St. Louis metropolitan statistical area. In
addition, especially because it is a hub for American
Airlines, the airport plays a key role in the nation’s
air transportation system.23 The airport has two
parallel air carrier runways that are separated by
1300 feet. When adverse weather conditions occur,
the airport is reduced to one precision instrument
approach, which causes the capacity of the airport
to decline 40 percent and congestion costs to
increase substantially.
Step 1: Identify Project Objectives. Possible
objectives for an airport expansion project include
the following:
• Reduce delays associated with airport
congestion,
• improve the efficiency of airport operations,
• increase the number of aircraft and passengers
the airport can serve, and
• permit new service by accommodating larger
and more efficient aircraft at the airport.
The Lambert infrastructure project was motivated
by an assessment that the existing airport was
already severely constrained (especially during bad
weather) and that projected demand could not be
met without unacceptable operational delays. A
related assessment was that Lambert, especially
because of its role as a hub, should not be allowed
to become a bottleneck that would have detrimen-
tal effects throughout the national system.24 Thus,
the proposed project would allow the airport to
effectively and safely accommodate projected levels
of aviation activity at an acceptable level of delay by
increasing airfield capacity for all types of weather
conditions and decreasing delays at Lambert as well
as nationwide.
Step 2: Specify Assumptions About Future
Airport Conditions. Generally, to formulate reason-
able plans, policymakers and researchers make
assumptions about the projected growth in demand
for airport services, changes in airport facilities and
capacity that are likely to occur independently of
the proposed project, and likely technological
advancements in air traffic control. Forecasts of
projected growth in airport activity are both difficult
to make and very important. Incorrect forecasts will
likely lead to a poor timing of airport investments,
with overly optimistic (i.e., too high) forecasts caus-
ing underused facilities and with overly pessimistic
(i.e., too low) forecasts imposing costs in terms of
delays and inconvenience.25 Similarly, ignoring
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24 It was also recognized that Lambert provides economic benefits
throughout the region and that those benefits would be threatened
by an inadequate airport. 
25 Estimates of passenger enplanements and aircraft operations for 1997
through 2010 for the Lambert expansion were generated by the FAA.
For 2011 through 2021, national estimates of the growth of passenger
enplanements and aircraft operations were assumed to hold for
Lambert. See FAA (1997).
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21 Two other related issues—how public capital is financed and how it
is used—have drawn attention. Barro (1990) showed that the benefits
from productive government spending should be compared with the
costs of the distortionary taxes required to fund the spending. See
Aschauer (2000b) for a simultaneous estimate of these two effects. See
the boxed insert for a discussion of the financing of airport expansions. 
22 Airports Council International web site: <http://www.airports.org/
traffic>.
23 During the BCA, Lambert was the hub for TWA. Subsequently,
American Airlines acquired TWA and uses Lambert as one of its hubs. 16 MAY/JUNE 2003
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FINANCING OF EXPANSIONS
A financial plan is a key component of any
airport expansion project.1 Three major sources
are used for financing the expansions of U.S. air-
ports. One of these is grants from the federal gov-
ernment through the FAA’s Airport Improvement
Program (AIP), which is discussed in more detail
below. AIP grants are funded with ticket taxes and
fees that are deposited into an airport’s trust fund.
The second source of funds, passenger facility
charges (PFCs), are additional fees charged by
airlines designated for capital improvements.
Approximately $1.5 billion in PFCs are collected
each year.2 The third major source for airport
financing, also discussed by Truitt and Esler (1996),
consists of tax-exempt bonds issued by airports,
which are based upon the expected future revenue
streams of the airports.3 Nearly 80 percent of all
funding from these airport revenue bonds are
allocated to the top 71 airports, while the more
than 3,000 remaining airports share what is left.
Funds generated by the new facility are used to
repay the principal and interest on these bonds.
Economic Issues Associated with AIP
Grants
An important issue with respect to AIP grants
is their effect on the recipient’s spending. One
hypothesis is that, when a state or local govern-
ment receives grant funds from a higher level of
government, the lower level of government acts
in the interests of the average constituent—the
median voter. The lower level of government treats
the grant funds as if they were an increase in the
median voter’s disposable income, a certain por-
tion of which would be spent on the designated
public services—in this case, airport usage. (That
portion depends on the voter’s marginal propensity
to consume on that category of public services.)
So, if the lower level of government acts in the
interest of the median voter, one would expect it
to spend a share of the grant equal to the median
voter’s marginal propensity to consume that public
good or service out of his disposable income.
The empirical evidence for most types of
public services does not support this theory.
Namely, many researchers, such as Case, Rosen,
and Hines (1993), have found that the impact of
intergovernmental grants on state and local public
expenditures exceeds the marginal propensity to
consume out of disposable income. This has been
called the “flypaper effect” because grant money
tends to stick where it hits.4 Cohen (2002) finds
significant evidence of a flypaper effect for AIP
grants. That is, he finds that the effect of AIP grants
on state and local airport spending is greater than
the median voter’s marginal propensity to spend
on airports, implying the presence of a flypaper
effect for airports.
The figure shows that AIP grants per capita
have varied over time in many states that have 
(Continued on p. 17)
4 See Gramlich (1977).
1 The financial condition of airlines and airports has deteriorated in
recent years. See Golaszewski (2003) and Gillen and Lall (2003) for
analyses of the financial shockwaves stemming from the events of
9/11. One possibility is that financial plans and the benefit-cost
analyses supporting major capital improvements developed prior
to 9/11 may no longer be justified.
2 Information on PFCs and revenue bonds was obtained from the
Air Transport Association’s Airline Handbook (2001, Chap. 7).
3 The Air Transport Association’s Airline Handbook refers to these as
general airport revenue bonds, which amounted to $53.6 billion
since 1982 and have comprised over 95 percent of all airport debt.
The bonds are serviced by airline revenues (e.g., landing fees and
terminal building rentals), nonairline revenues (e.g., parking lot
revenues, rental car concessions, terminal concessions, and general
aviation fees), and interest income from various funds and accounts.
Constant 1992$ (per capita)
Per Capita AIP Grants to Selected States
1988-96
SOURCE: Cohen (2002).













Figure B1future changes in airport facilities and capacity
can lead to ill-timed investments. For example, a
project to reduce runway congestion may be unwise
if some other project affects the benefits of the pro-
posed project. Finally, a runway expansion project
may be unwise if scheduled improvements in air
traffic equipment will accomplish the same result.
Step 3: Identify the Base Case. To assess one
course of action, it is necessary to compare it with
an alternative. One alternative, the base case, is not
a “do nothing” alternative, but rather a reasonable
course of action, absent the proposal being scruti-
nized. The base case assumes that airport managers
will make optimal use of the existing and planned
(i.e., currently underway and/or funded) airport
infrastructure. In addition, as problems arise due to
increases in airport traffic, airport managers, users,
and air traffic managers are assumed to respond
as best they can. Without question, the assumptions
underlying this alternative can affect the decision
of whether or not to undertake an expansion pro-
ject.26 With respect to the Lambert expansion, the
assessment of the no-action alternative was that it
would neither solve the capacity shortcomings
nor mitigate the delays.
Step 4: Specify Alternatives To Meet the
Objectives. With respect to Lambert, numerous
alternatives were examined and eliminated from
detailed analysis. These alternatives included the
increased use of other modes of transportation,
such as railroads, buses, and automobiles; the
construction of a new airport to replace Lambert;
a multiple airport system including Lambert and a
supplemental airport; numerous airfield alignments;
and other on-airport alternatives, such as the use
of advanced navigational aids.
Various reasons led to the rejection of many
alternatives. The increased use of other modes of
transportation was rejected because it did not meet
either local or national aviation needs and it would
not have enhanced Lambert’s contribution to the
region. The construction of a new airport was
rejected because of time and cost requirements.
Moreover, other airports in the region could not
fulfill the need for a new runway for various reasons,
including Lambert’s role as a hub, the lack of facili-
ties at other airports, and airspace constraints. The
airfield alignment alternatives were rejected because
they were infeasible or because of environmental
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large hub airports (i.e., an airport with greater than
1 percent of the nation’s passenger enplanements).
The U.S. Congress has debated reauthorization of
the AIP on more than one occasion in recent years,
which leads one to question how states and local-
ities respond to cuts compared with increases in
AIP grants. Specifically, when federal government
grants are reduced, do states and localities reduce
their own spending in the same way they increase
their spending when grants are increased? States
and localities may also try to pick up the slack
when grants from the federal government are cut.
Cohen (2002) looks at the question of symmetric
state and local airport expenditure responses to
cuts and increases in AIP grants over the period
1988-96, and he cannot reject the hypothesis that
the state and local spending response is symmetric
in the cases of cuts and increases. This is important
because it implies that states and localities do
not replace funds for airport expenditures with
funds from other areas.
One other possible application of inter-
governmental grants discussed in the public
finance literature in Oates (1972) is to induce
states to internalize spillovers. In other words, a
higher level of government (such as the FAA) may
use grants to subsidize states and localities for
the benefits that they confer upon other states
through their airport spending choices, as pro-
posed by Cohen (1997). This subsidy would result
in a shift in the marginal benefit curve that would
further result in a higher equilibrium level of air-
port spending.5 Thus, if these grants were used
to subsidize all states that confer benefits upon
other states, the subsidies could effectively induce
all states to spend the socially optimal amount
on airports. Ideally, however, this type of subsidy
would be done at the individual airport level. The
practical implementation of such a policy would
be very challenging because the complexity of
the air transportation network would make it
extremely difficult to assess the magnitude of the
spillover benefits.
5 Coughlin, Cohen, and Khan (2002) present a similar marginal
benefit/marginal cost framework in more detail for the optimal
provision of aviation security.reasons. Several on-airport alternatives were elimi-
nated because they did not provide sufficient capac-
ity or they did not allow for operations considered
critical for a hub airport.
Based on discussions between airport officials
and the FAA, an agreement was reached in February
1997 that the only feasible alternative to the airport’s
system of operation at that time was the airport
sponsor’s preferred plan for expansion. Thus, the
comparison in the BCA was between the baseline
and the alternative known as W-1W. The baseline
alternative was to maintain Lambert in its present
configuration with no additional capacity, whereas
alternative W-1W was the construction of a new
runway and the extension of an existing runway.
The planned completion date was late 2001, with
2002 being the first full year of operation. 
Step 5: Determine the Evaluation Period. The
evaluation period is the number of years over
which the benefits and costs of an investment are
considered. To determine an appropriate evaluation
period, one must first determine the economic life
of the investment, which is the length of time the
asset is expected to achieve its goals in a cost-
effective manner. Generally speaking, the FAA uses
an economic life of 20 years beyond the completion
of construction for major airport infrastructure
projects. For the Lambert expansion, the evaluation
period began with the expected start of construction
in 1998. Benefits were first expected from W-1W
in 2002 and were expected to continue for 20 years
through 2021.
Step 6: Measure and Compare the Benefits and
Costs of Alternatives. The benefits of capacity-
related airport projects primarily stem from the
cost savings to airport users. A new runway, for
example, should reduce aircraft, passenger, and
cargo delay during normal airport operations. The
costs of delay are incurred primarily by aircraft
operators via more aircraft operating hours, pas-
sengers via longer trip times, and cargo shippers via
longer shipping times.27 Estimates of the time
savings associated with an expansion project are
generated with capacity simulation models.
The time savings must be translated into a single
overall monetary measure. All values for benefits
as well as costs, regardless of the year in which the
benefits or costs arise, are expressed in constant
(real) dollars. The FAA provides instructions as to
the appropriate source for converting the following:
(i) the reduction in aircraft delays into operating
cost savings, (ii) the reduction in passenger travel
delays into passenger travel time values, and (iii)
the reduction of air cargo delay hours into oppor-
tunity cost savings.
Obviously, the benefits of any alternative will
be at least partially offset by its costs. Costs include
all capital, labor, and natural resources required for
each alternative, no matter who—a governmental
unit, the flying public, the general public, or some
other group—bears the cost. Most airport projects
involve relatively large expenditures at the beginning
of a project in return for a flow of future benefits.
Because a dollar expended today is more costly than
a dollar expended later and a dollar of benefits
received today is more valuable than a dollar of
benefits received later, future cash flows must be
converted into present value to allow for a meaning-
ful comparison of a project’s benefits with its costs.
The formula for the present value (PV) of a
future benefit or cost to be received/incurred n years
from the present is
PV=Vn/(1+r)
n,
where V is future value in year n in constant dollars,
ris the annual real discount rate, and nis the number
of years from the base year.
The PV formula allows a comparison of the
benefits and costs for each alternative to see which,
if any, is the most attractive. Various comparison
methods are used, suggesting that no one method
is superior to the others. Here, we will restrict our
attention to two methods that are recommended
when federal grants are involved—net present value
(NPV) and benefit-cost ratio (B/C).
The formula for the calculation of NPV is
,
where B is future annual benefits in constant dollars,
C is future annual costs in constant dollars, r is the
annual real discount rate, k is the number of years
from the base year over which the project is to be
evaluated, and t is an index from 0 to k representing
the number of years from the base year.
To be selected, an alternative must meet two
conditions. First, it must have a positive NPV—that
is, its benefits must exceed its costs. Second, the
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27 One complication arises from the fact that an airport expansion pro-
ject, because it improves service, will cause greater use of the facility
than would have occurred without the investment. These additional
users will place new demands on the facility, eroding to some extent
the per operation delay savings to preexisting airport users.
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all other alternatives.28
One problem with ranking projects using NPV
involves comparisons of mutually exclusive alterna-
tives of greatly different sizes. For example, assume
two mutually exclusive alternatives—one with a $1
billion cost and a $100 million NPV and the other
with a $100 million cost and a $30 million NPV. Based
on the NPV, the former alternative would be chosen
over the latter. If the airport is able to borrow as much
as required to undertake all worthwhile projects,
the NPV criterion would yield the correct choice.
However, if the airport is constrained in the
amount of debt it can issue, say to $1 billion, and
has several other independent potential projects
with positive NPVs, then it may be best to select the
$100 million alternative and use the remaining
$900 million to fund the other projects. In this way,
the $1 billion of borrowed funds might yield a sum
of NPVs in excess of $100 million.
A second method of comparing benefits with
costs is the B/C, which is simply the PV of benefits
divided by the PV of costs. The formula for this cal-
culation is 
Obviously, projects with positive NPVs will have
B/Cs greater than 1. However, the B/C method might
fail to answer correctly the question of how to
accomplish a project’s objectives most effectively.
Analogous to our preceding discussion, problems
with using this method can arise when comparing
mutually exclusive projects of different sizes. Note
that the larger alternative in the preceding example
has a B/C ratio of 1.1, while the smaller alternative
has a B/C ratio of 1.3. Recall that, depending on fund-
ing options and other considerations, the smaller
project may or may not be the better alternative.
With respect to the BCA for the Lambert expan-
sion, a number of economic and programmatic
assumptions were made. Benefits and costs were
denominated in 1997 dollars and, following FAA
guidelines, discounted at 7 percent. Benefits consist
of cost savings to passengers and to airlines. Passen-
gers avoid delays. As a result, cost savings to passen-
gers are the value of the time saved. The value of






















passenger time was assumed to be $27.90 per hour.
Similarly, airlines avoid delays, so the cost savings
are in the form of reduced variable operating costs.
Variable operating costs per hour were assumed to
be $1,189 in 2002, $1,333 in 2010, and $1,581 in
2021.
Alternative W-1W was assumed to be completed
in 2001, with benefits beginning in 2002 and
extending through 2021. Table 1 shows the calcu-
lated benefits in (discounted) present value dollars.
With passenger delay savings of $661 million and
operation delay savings of $908 million, total ben-
efits were estimated to be $1,569 million.
Turning to the cost side, investment costs were
assumed to occur so that 10 percent were incurred
in 1998, 35 percent in both 1999 and 2000, and
20 percent in 2001. Annual recurring costs were
assumed to be 3 percent of the initial capital cost
per year. Table 2 shows the calculated costs. In pre-
sent value terms, investment costs were estimated
to be $537 million and recurring costs were esti-
mated to be $142 million. These costs are offset to
some extent by the disposal value of $76 million.29
Thus, total costs were estimated to be $603 million.
Given the estimated benefits of $1,569 million
and costs of $603 million, the NPV of alternative
W-1W was $966 million. Thus, alternative W-1W
was viewed as economically viable. The B/C was 2.6.
Step 7: Evaluate the Variability of Benefit-Cost
Estimates. Underlying every BCA are numerous
assumptions, estimates, and forecasts, which, if
inaccurate, may introduce error in the NPV results. A
thorough BCA will include a sensitivity analysis,
which is a standard tool that varies key assumptions,
estimates, and forecasts and provides alternative
results for examination.
The evaluation of alternative W-1W examined
three areas of risk: (i) investment cost overruns of
10, 25, and 50 percent; (ii) slippage in the construc-
tion schedule by 1, 2, and 5 years; and (iii) three
cases in which traffic deviates from forecasted levels
after 2005—traffic is held constant at 2005 levels,
traffic is at 90 percent of the forecast, and traffic is at
110 percent of forecast.
The NPV and B/C results are shown in Table 3.
For each case in which only one variable is altered,
the NPV remains positive. A slippage in the construc-
tion schedule by five years causes the lowest NPV
MAY/JUNE 2003      19
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Cohen and Coughlin
28 Note that this criterion is consistent with the notion discussed earlier
that decisionmakers should choose the level of airport capacity such
that the marginal benefits of an expansion equal the marginal costs.
Such an action would maximize the net benefits of an expansion.
29 The disposal value was determined by depreciating the initial capital
investment at 3 percent per year until 2021 and then discounting that
result to its present value.of $248 million and the lowest B/C of 1.4. Not sur-
prisingly, the NPV rises to $1095 million and the
B/C rises to 2.7 when traffic exceeds its forecasted
levels by 10 percent. Only when the overrun in
investment costs is 50 percent and the slippage in
the construction schedule is 5 years does the NPV
become negative.
Step 8: Recommend a Best Course of Action. The
final step of a BCA is to recommend a specific
alternative. The FAA recommends that the alterna-
tive with the largest, positive NPV be given primary
consideration. However, the project sponsor may
select another alternative if it provides important
hard-to-quantify benefits or is substantially less
20 MAY/JUNE 2003
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Sensitivity Analysis for W-1W*
Scenario  NPV (1997 dollars in millions) B/C  
W-1W as planned  $966 2.6   
Investment cost overrun
10% $912  2.4 
25% $832 2.1
50% $698 1.8  
Slippage in construction schedule    
1 year  $795  2.3
2 years $639 2.1
5 years $248 1.4  
Traffic relative to forecast after 2005    
Constant $551  1.9
90% of forecast $782 2.2
110% of forecast $1,095 2.7
Two-variable analysis
10% overrun and 1-year slippage  $741  2.1
25% overrun and 2-year slippage $505 1.7
50% overrun and 5-year slippage ($21) 1.0  
NOTE: *See FAA (1997, Table 5).
Table 3
Cost Estimate for W-1W* (1997 dollars in
millions)
Cost  Present value  
Investment $537
Recurring $142
Disposal value  ($76)
Total cost less disposal value  $603
NOTE: *See FAA (1997, Table 3).
Table 2
Benefit Estimate for W-1W* (1997 dollars in
millions)
Benefit  Present value  
Passenger delay savings  $661
Operational delay savings  $908
Total delay savings  $1,569
NOTE: *See FAA (1997, Table 4).
Table 1risky than the alternative with the largest NPV. For
the BCA of the Lambert expansion performed by
the FAA, alternative W-1W is the preferred alterna-
tive. Its NPV is positive and, because it was the only
alternative evaluated, there is no option that yields
a larger NPV. In addition, the sensitivity analysis
suggests that the net effects of W-1W are likely to
be positive under a wide range of scenarios.
AIRPORT EXPANSION IMPACTS THAT
GENERATE CONTROVERSY 
Airport expansion projects have impacts far
beyond those identified in economic impact studies.
Numerous social and environmental impacts that
generate much displeasure and contentiousness
are the norm.30 Lawsuits are filed in opposition to
virtually every expansion of a major airport. Oppo-
nents generally challenge the right of airport officials
to override local zoning rules or increase noise or
air pollution. Almost without exception, the legal
challenges are unsuccessful. Thus, the projects,
albeit delayed, do proceed.
Prior to FAA approval of an expansion project,
actions to mitigate adverse effects of expansions are
reviewed. Below we take a closer look at two com-
mon impacts—one that can be characterized as a
social impact and one as an environmental impact.
Displacement and Compensation of
People and Businesses
According to the FAA (1998), the Lambert expan-
sion would necessitate the relocation of 5,680 people,
including 2,324 households. Over 1900 residential
parcels of property were to be acquired. In addition,
the relocation of 75 businesses would be required.
The city of Bridgeton was to bear the brunt of the
relocation.31 To mitigate the substantial disruptive
effects, various services designed to educate, inform,
and respond to those affected were and are being
provided. Nonetheless, controversy abounds.
Not surprisingly, many of the homeowners
forced to sell their property and relocate were less
than pleased with the airport expansion. Litigation
between them and the City of St. Louis over condem-
nation of their homes has been extensive. As reported
by McClellan (2001), the litigation has occurred
despite the fact that the city has the authority to
seize homes and has made “an effort to negotiate
with each of the homeowners.” Despite attempts to
use independent citizens to determine a “fair and
reasonable price,” some think the city’s offers were
unfair. Often, residents accept them anyway since
they do not want to have to continue fighting, and
they want to escape “neighborhoods where nobody
dares put money into their homes.”
Market forces underlie these compensation
prices. Although some might consider the buyout
price to be too low, because the homes are already
located near the airport and, thus, affected by associ-
ated noise, it is likely that the value of these homes
and those in surrounding communities already
reflects the proximity to the airport. These circum-
stances might make them less desirable in general
in the local real estate market, which we discuss
further.
Environmental Issues: Noise
The expansion of an airport likely leads to
additional noise in the area surrounding an airport.
Some of the affected area is likely to be acquired
by the airport as part of the expansion. To the extent
that remaining residential areas must endure
increased noise, one can argue that these residents
and homeowners should be compensated. Not sur-
prisingly, there is often opposition from local com-
munity groups when an airport in an urban area
plans to expand. Healy (2002) notes one example
of this resistance in the Boston area, which has led
to the stipulation that the new runway be used only
on “days when northwest winds blow at 11.5 miles
per hour or more.” 
Housing prices are likely affected by airport
noise.32 Because noise becomes capitalized into
property values, it is an example of a pecuniary
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30 A lengthy, but not exhaustive, list of the social and environmental
impacts includes the disruption/destruction of communities/
neighborhoods, historic areas, biotic communities, floodplains,
farmland, and parks as well as adverse effects on noise levels, air
quality, and water quality.
31 Higgins and Chase (2002) state that the cities of Bridgeton and St.
Charles brought lawsuits in state court challenging Lambert’s right to
override local zoning laws and in federal court arguing that the FAA
failed to consider more cost-effective ways to improve the airport.
The lawsuits failed, and ground on the new runway was broken in
July 2001.
32 For example, Espey and Lopez (2000) find for the Reno-Sparks, Nevada,
area a $2400 difference between the prices of homes subject to at
least 65 decibels of noise and other equivalent homes. Tompkins et al.
(1998) find mixed evidence of capitalization of noise for an airport in
Manchester, England. They also found, however, that the benefits of
easy access to the airport outweighed other costs associated with
proximity, such as noise.externality.33 Consequently, an airport expansion
leading to additional noise should be countered with
a one-time compensation of property owners to
account for this capitalization, or property owners
should be helped to take defensive action against
the noise. Those who choose to live near airports
should not be compensated further, since they
receive relatively inexpensive housing and they
choose to live there. Local government in Chicago
provides an example of city assistance to home-
owners: In 1996, mayor Richard M. Daley began a
program that has led to the soundproofing of nearly
4,000 homes and 75 schools in communities sur-
rounding O’Hare Airport. In the case of the Lambert
expansion, homeowners in a designated area likely
to be adversely affected by increased noise were
offered three options: sales assistance, sound insu-
lation, or a cash payment. In exchange the airport
received the right, known as an avigation easement,
to generate increased noise.34
OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO
CONGESTION
Airport expansions increase the capacity of the
air transportation system by increasing the amount
of capital. As discussed previously, an alternative
solution might entail using the existing capital more
efficiently. In this section we examine one such
solution, congestion-based pricing of landing fees.35
Airport congestion is an example of a true (or
technological) externality because the resulting
delays imposed from too many aircraft operators
choosing to land at peak hours causes disutility to
others who are waiting to use the runways. Some
researchers, most notably Morrison and Winston
(1989), have argued in favor of congestion-based
pricing of landing fees to solve the airport congestion
problem. They claim that this type of pricing system
may make airport use more efficient. At most air-
ports, landing fees are structured according to aircraft
size or weight, and the runway capacity is allocated
to aircraft on a “first come, first served” basis (Bailey,
2002). Under the current system, there is a market
failure due to the fact that aircraft owners fail to
internalize (i.e., fully bear) the costs to society that
arise when they choose to land at an already busy
airport. These costs come in the form of travel time
delay due to longer taxi lines, circling of aircraft
before being cleared for landing, etc.
With congestion-based pricing, the owners of
aircraft would pay landing fees based on the
marginal damage in terms of runway delay that is
caused by their aircraft rather than pay fees based
on aircraft size or weight. These fees might vary at
a particular airport depending on the time of day.
This way, when deciding when and where to land,
an owner of an aircraft would be forced to consider
the marginal social costs of landing at a particular
airport at a particular time, instead of merely look-
ing at the marginal private costs. Thus, congestion-
based landing fees can correct for the externality
that causes congestion at certain airports at certain
times of the day. But it also has implications for
equity, since small planes would pay as much as
large ones at any given time of day. The FAA is con-
sidering imposing congestion-based landing fees
at some airports, including New York’s La Guardia
airport and Boston’s Logan airport.36
The arguments for congestion pricing made by
Morrison and Winston are similar to studies from
the road-pricing literature discussed by Small (1992),
where there are many users of the public infrastruc-
ture. But in the case of most airports, many of the
airport users (i.e., airlines) have market power, which
differs from the road-pricing case. Brueckner (2002a)
shows that when an airport is dominated by a single
monopolist airline, the congestion effects are com-
pletely internalized by the airline, thus providing no
role for congestion pricing. In competitive situations,
even when the number of competitors is two, the
airlines do not internalize the congestion that they
impose on each other. Thus, there would be a role
for congestion pricing, where the toll varies inversely
with the carrier’s flight share.
Another possible solution to airport congestion
is airline route restructuring. As reported by
McCartney (2002), American Airlines recently
22 MAY/JUNE 2003
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33 Some argue that because airport noise is an externality, government
intervention is necessary. Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 17) provide a
required condition for a (technological) externality to be present: “An
externality is present whenever some individual’s (say A’s) utility or
production relationships include real (that is, nonmonetary) variables,
whose values are chosen by others (persons, corporations, governments)
without particular attention to the effects on A’s welfare.” However,
they note that a pecuniary externality (as opposed to a technological
externality) occurs when one person’s actions affect the financial
circumstances of another. A pecuniary externality occurs when one
person’s actions affect only the prices that another party faces, and
thus it is not an externality that necessitates governmental intervention.
34 See FAA (1998) for details.
35 The inefficiencies that result in frequent delays at airports have con-
vinced some that airports should be privatized. See Morrison and
Winston (2000) for a discussion of airport privatization.announced that they would begin to move away from
the traditional “hub and spoke” route structure at
some of their hubs and move toward a “rolling hub”
structure where passengers wait for planes to arrive
at hubs instead of planes waiting for passengers to
arrive. Southwest Airlines has been successful at
implementing such a route structure, and if enough
airlines were to adopt such a structure there could
be noticeable amelioration of congestion.
CONCLUSIONS
Air transportation services play an important
role in every metropolitan area. Congestion is a
problem at many of these airports. Because of the
network features of the air transportation system,
congestion at one airport can have adverse effects
on the operations at other airports. The large cost
associated with congestion provides the incentive
for mitigating congestion. But, finding satisfactory
solutions is complicated by the interconnectedness
of the air transportation system. In this paper, we
reviewed the economic analyses and issues associ-
ated with one common solution, expanding the
capacity of airports. While an expansion may reduce
congestion, we show that congestion may persist. 
Expanding an airport is a complex undertaking
that requires a large capital expenditure. A funda-
mental question is whether the benefits of the pro-
ject exceed its costs. Ideally, the proposed expansion
maximizes the net present value of the difference
between the benefits and the costs. By examining
the steps in a benefit-cost analysis for Lambert–
St. Louis International Airport, we illustrate the
economic analysis that underlies a typical expansion
project.
The benefits of an expansion project to users
of air transportation services extend throughout
the local economy and likely beyond, whereas
some significant social and environmental impacts
are concentrated near the airport. Not surprisingly,
the typical expansion project is controversial, with
lawsuits being quite common. We attempt to illus-
trate these social and environmental effects and
examine ways to mitigate their adverse effects.
Airport expansions frequently disrupt neighborhoods
and nearby communities, an example of which is the
destruction of homes in Bridgeton that was judged
to be a necessary part of the Lambert expansion.
Homeowners received compensation for their prop-
erty, but entire neighborhoods were destroyed.
Another disruption is the additional noise imposed
on surrounding communities due to larger airports.
The new runway project in Boston and the associ-
ated noise led to agreements on limitations of its
future use.
Finally, we examined an alternative to expan-
sion—congestion pricing—that attempts to use the
existing airport capital more efficiently. We demon-
strate that a tax on airport users would improve
airport efficiency. This is consistent to some extent
with the notion of congestion pricing, which posits
that users should be charged separate landing fees,
based on the marginal damage in terms of travel
delays that given users impose on others. 
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